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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The authority which confers jurisdiction on the Court to 
hear this Appeal is Article VIII, Section 3, Utah State 
Constitution; Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2, Rule 3(i), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in 
favor of defendant\respondents after making a specific finding 
that there were genuine issues of material fact which should be 
decided by a jury. 
The standard of review to be applied to this issue is 
correctness without deference to the trial court, because the 
trial court, when faced with a motion for summary judgment must 
follow the relevant Utah civil procedure rule. Rule 56(c) of 
U.R.C.P. provides that the "judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions... and (affidavits)... 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law". If there is any issue of material fact, the 
court, as a matter of law, cannot grant a summary judgment 
motion. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its decision that as a 
matter of law, plaintiff\appellant could not sustain or establish 
the requisite elements of its case and therefore, did not allow 
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;he jury to make the ultimate finding. 
The standard of review to be applied to this issue is the 
correctness standard. In Re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah 
:t. App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Jtah Const, art. I section 10: 
nIn capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, 
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight 
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall 
consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the 
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded." 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-21-2 (1953): 
"All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other 
than those mentioned in the next section (78-21-3), are to 
be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is 
addressed them except when otherwise provided." 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-21-1 (1953): 
"In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal 
property, with or without damages or for money claimed for 
injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless 
a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered." 
Rule 38(a), Utah R. Civ. P.: 
"(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as 
declared by the constitution or as given by statute 
shall be preserved to the parties." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment and Judgment and 
Decree signed by the Honorable F. L. GUNNELL, District Judge in 
the First Judicial District Court of Box Elder County. Said 
Judgments have been declared final judgments by the Court 
pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
b. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition at the trial 
Court 
Marlin and Theresa Loosle brought this action in the first 
District Court of Box Elder County to quiet title in their 
property against the claimed right of Defendants. Both parties 
moved for Summary Judgment, which Trial Court Judge Gunnell in 
his Findings and Ruling decided in favor of Defendant First 
Federal Savings and Loan and Hillam Abstracting And Insurance 
Agency, Trustee. 
c. Relevant Facts 
Appellants were owners of a house that was purchased with 
financing through defendantXrespondent. After purchasing the 
home, appellants drilled a new well for water to supplement the 
existing water supply. Approximately eight years after 
purchasing the home, on the advice of defendantXrespondent, 
appellant sought to refinance the home and found out that the 
home appraised for approximately twenty-four thousand dollars 
less than the purchase price despite many improvements and a 
general increase in property value in the area. 
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Appellants brought this action because they felt they were 
misrepresented by the defendantXrespondent' s first appraisal in 
1980. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs established that the property in question, 
despite the improvements made and the fact that all property in 
that area rose in value, was appraised for approximately twenty-
four thousand dollars less than the appraisal at the time of 
their purchase eight years earlier. Both appraisals were done by 
the defendant\respondent, who was also the lender. This lead 
plaintiffs to believe that their detrimental reliance on 
defendantXrespondent coupled with negligent misrepresentation by 
defendantXrespondent caused them monetary damages. Utah courts 
have established that when a person or entity is in a position of 
supposed expertise where it should be obvious that the person 
asking will rely on the information requested and furnished, that 
person or entity is often held liable under the doctrine of 
"negligent misrepresentation". 
Whether the well that the plaintiff's and their neighbors 
drilled for water which ultimately provided culinary water for 
the property in question was appurtenant to the property is an 
ultimate fact upon which the jury would base a decision as to who 
should prevail in the matter concerning the well being 
appurtenant to the property. Ultimate facts are not to be 
withheld from the jury. This involves a right to a jury trial 
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which was denied by the court granting summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is not appropriate where there is a 
question of fact raised by the pleadings and affidavits that is 
material to the resolution of the case. Summary judgment was not 
appropriate here because there was an issue of material fact 
concerning negligent misrepresentation by the 
defendant\respondent and whether the well drilled by plaintiff 
and his neighbors is appurtenant to the property as raised by the 
pleadings, affidavits and depositions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GRANTING A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS WHEN THERE EXISTED 
MATERIAL FACTS CONCERNING NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION BY 
DEFENDANT AND A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE WELL DUG BY PLAINTIFF 
AND HIS NEIGHBORS WAS APPURTENANT TO THE PROPERTY. 
The plaintiffs in this case had a right to a jury trial 
because there is a question as to whether the defendant had 
negligently misrepresented the value of the property the 
plaintiff purchased at the time of purchase. The Utah Code 
states in pertinent part: 
"In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal 
property, with or without damages... an issue of fact may 
be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived..." 
Utah Code Annot. section 78-21-1 (1953). 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the same provision and 
had this to say: 
"... It is our opinion that the above language, if given a 
reasonable and rational construction, must be interpreted as 
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declaring that all issues of fact relating to possession and 
right to possession of specific real or personal property 
may be determined by a jury unless a jury trial is 
waived..." Holland v Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 14-15, 327 P.2d 
250, 252 (1958). 
More recently the Utah Supreme Court has said: 
"... There is a right to a jury trial on all questions of 
fact in any action to determine the right to possession of 
real property. Holland v Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 14-15, 327 
P.2d 250, 252 (1958); see Utah Code Ann. section 78-21-1 
(1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 38(a). The present case is clearly 
one to determine the right to possess real property. 
Therefore, the Hansens were entitled to have the question of 
the location of the corner determined by the judge only if 
that question is one of law." Hansen v Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 
15 (Utah 1988). 
In the present case, there has been evidence presented that 
shows that there is a question as to whether the defendant 
negligently misrepresented the plaintiff in 1980 when they 
appraised the property in question for $89,900.00. In other 
states the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation has been 
applied to banks. In California one court in Francis v 
Eisenmayer, 340 P.2d 54 (Cal. App. 1959), said: 
"...Liability is predicated on the alleged fact that the 
plaintiffs have been misled by the bank's agent to their 
prejudice. A cause of action in tort may arise against a 
bank for misrepresentation of its duties and functions 
independent of any contractual relationship." 
The trial court, when faced with a motion for summary 
judgment, must follow the relevant Utah civil procedure rule. 
Rule 56(c) of U.R.C.P. provides that the "judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions... and 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thus, according to the rule, if there is any 
8 
genuine issue of material fact, the court, as a matter of law, 
cannot grant a summary judgment motion. 
The court's role in determining whether a motion for summary 
judgment should be granted has been further defined and 
documented in recent Utah case law. According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, in Barlow Society v Commercial Security Bank, 723 
P.2d 398 (Utah 1986); Durnham v Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 
1977); Brower v Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987), the following 
guidelines are to be strictly adhered to: (1) the Court must 
construe the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, (2) summary judgment should only be granted when the 
matter is clear and there is no room for doubt, and (3) if there 
is a statute governing the exercise of summary judgment in a 
particular context, the statute should be followed. 
Relevant to the preceding guidelines, the Utah Supreme Court 
in the recent case of Chapman v Primary Children's Hospital, 784 
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), stated that "close calls" on factual 
issues "are for juries, not judges, to make." Id. at 1186. Thus, 
summary judgment is not appropriate unless the parties affidavits 
and other instruments make it clear that no genuine issue remains 
as to matters of material fact. 
These guidelines are significant to the present case. The 
facts to this case are not clear to the point that they leave no 
doubt. There is a definite question as to whether the defendant 
negligently misrepresented the first appraisal for the value of 
the land. It is the plaintiffs contention that the defendant may 
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lave represented an inflated value of the property at the time 
:he plaintiff was securing a loan in order to make more money in 
Interest. It is hard to see how after making many improvements 
:o the land over an eight year stretch the value of it could 
iecrease by approximately $24,000.00 despite the fact that other 
property in the area had all increased in value. 
Also at issue in this case is ownership and water rights 
connected to a well that plaintiff and his neighbors drilled on a 
leighbors property. Defendants claim that the ownership in the 
veil is appurtenant to the property and therefore, goes with the 
property. Plaintiffs contend differently. 
Defendants base their claim on the fact that the language 
contained in the deed says that all improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral oil and gas rights and 
profits, water, water rights and water stock, and all fixtures 
now or hereafter attached to the property... shall become part 
of, or go with, the property. 
Defendants further claim that without the rights to the 
water coming from this well, the property would suffer a great 
loss in value because there would not be any usable culinary 
water to the house. They seem to be forgetting, however, that 
when plaintiffs purchased the home, they purchased the same 
culinary water rights that would exist, and did in fact exist, 
before the well. And they purchased the home for approximately 
$24,000.00 more than the home is now worth with the rights to the 
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new well. 
Plaintiffs contend that the rights to the well can and 
should be separate from the rest of the property. In Utah, water 
rights can be separated from the land upon which they have been 
used and are considered independent of any rights in land. 
Whitmore v Salt Lake City, 89 Utah 387, 57 P.2d 726 (1936); but 
the water user must connect himself by title to the right he 
claims. Salina Creek Irr. Co. v Salina Stock Co., 7 Utah 456, 27 
p. 578 (1891), aff'd 163 U.S. 109 (1896). The user must either 
receive the right through deed or similar instrument, or petition 
with the State Engineer for appropriation of the right. Utah Code 
Ann. sections 73-3-1 and 73-5-13 (1953); Salina, supra.. 
In the present case, the plaintiff has filed for 
appropriation of the rights to that water with the State Engineer 
and is at this time still waiting for the results to that 
petition. 
The issue or controversy over whether the defendant 
negligently misrepresented the value of the property to the 
plaintiff and the question of whether the rights to the water in 
the new well are appurtenant to the property are material issues 
of fact that should be decided by a jury after having testimony 
and evidence presented to them. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONCERNING WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS HAD 
ESTABLISHED AND MET THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS CONCERNING THEIR CASE. 
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In Duqan v Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined the elements necessary to establish an action in deceit 
based on fraudulent misrepresentation. The elements outlined 
are: A representation; concerning a presently existing material 
fact; which was false; which representor either knew to be false 
or made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation; for purpose of inducing 
other party to act upon it; that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, did in fact rely upon 
it; and was thereby induced to act; to his injury and damage. Id. 
at 1240. 
It is a question of fact whether the defendant 
misrepresented the value of the property at the time of purchase 
and it is a known fact that the plaintiff suffered damages in the 
approximate amount of $24,000.00 not including interest that 
would also have been paid over time, pushing the amount of damage 
much higher. It seems, therefore, that if the elements outlined 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Duqan are not satisfied, there is at 
least a question as to whether they could be satisfied. 
The court in Duqan also held that, "a vendee of real 
property, in absence of facts putting him on notice, has no duty 
to investigate to determine whether vendor has misrepresented the 
area conveyed". Id. at 1240. From this it is evident that at the 
time of the first appraisal, the plaintiff did not have the 
necessary responsibility to double check to make sure the 
defendant was not misrepresenting him. Whether the defendant was 
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indeed misrepresenting the plaintiff is a fact that must now be 
decided on by a jury. 
In Norton v Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,859 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court found that "Summary Judgment is appropriate if 
the pleadings, Affidavits and other submissions of the parties 
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists..." In the 
case at bar, the pleadings on their face show a genuine issue of 
material fact. The deposition of the plaintiffs show contested 
material facts. 
Because there are issues of material fact, this case should 
not have been decided by summary judgment. The Utah Supreme 
Court set out general parameters further explaining when a motion 
for summary judgment should and should not be granted in Durnham 
v Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). In that case the Court 
said: 
"Summary judgment... should not be done on conjecture, but 
only when the matter is clear; and in the case of doubt, the 
doubt should be resolved in allowing the challenged party 
opportunity of at least attempting to prove his right to 
recover... (U)nless the court is able to conclude that there 
is no dispute on material facts... the court should not 
summarily... render judgment... as a matter of law." Id. at 
1338. (Emphasis added). 
The matters in this case are not clear, and therefore, the 
outcome of this case should ultimately be decided by a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
When a person seeks to buy property and has the bank from 
which he intends to borrow the money do the appraisal, that 
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person usually trusts that the appraisal is accurate. But when a 
person buys the property and finds out approximately eight years 
later that the value of the property has decreased by over 25%, 
despite many improvements to the property and a general increase 
in property values in the area, he begins to wonder if the value 
illustrated by the first appraisal was indeed accurate. This is 
what has happened in the case at hand. 
The plaintiffs in this case, Marlin and Theresa Loosle, 
contend that they were negligently misrepresented by the 
defendants and as a result, they suffered damages. 
Unfortunately, the defendants were granted a summary judgment 
despite the fact that material issues of fact exist. 
Summary judgment is not appropriate if there are issues of 
material fact, and as has been outlined, there are such issues in 
this case involving not only the negligent misrepresentation, but 
also whether the well dug by the plaintiff and his neighbors is 
appurtenant to the property. Therefore, the outcome of this 
trial should have been decided by a jury, not the judge on a 
summary judgment. 
The plaintiff respectfully asks that the trial court be 
reversed and judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. 
Alternatively, the plaintiff asks that the Supreme Court reverse 
the summary judgment granted by the trial court and remand for a 
new trial based on the material issues that remain unresolved. 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and THERESA 
L. LOOSLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN and 
HILLAM ABSTRACTING AND 
INSURANCE AGENCY, Trustee, 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 890000213 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court having reviewed the Motion supporting 
affidavits and reviewed the memorandum filed in connection therewith 
as well as the opposition thereto along with the affidavit and 
supporting documents, issues the following MEMORANDUM OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
In reverse order the Court finds that there may be a genuine 
issue of a material fact with respect to whether or not the statute 
of limitations applies to the facts of this case. So, that portion 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. 
In the mind of the Court the more clear issue is the question 
of whether or not there is an issue remaining as to the alleged 
livil No. 890000213 
age 2 
lisrepresentation. A review of the file and the material contained 
n the file indicates the following: 
The financial arrangements as to the purchase price were made 
prior to any involvement of the bank. 
The banks* involvement was solely that of the lender and the 
bank was not serving in any fiduciary relationship with the 
Plaintiff other than in the handling of the money. 
The appraisal made by the bank was made by their agents for 
their internal purposes as a matter of documenting the 
legitimacy of the loan for their auditors and had no bearing 
in the obtaining of the initial transaction which gives rise 
to this lawsuit, 
applying the foregoing which appear to be uncontroverted facts to 
.he elements which are required to sustain an action based on 
raudulent representation as set forth in the case of Dugan v. 
[ones/ 615 P.2d 1239 the Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff 
is a matter of law cannot sustain or establish the requisite 
elements and accordingly the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
s Granted. 
The Counsel for Defendant to prepare an order in conformance 
rith this opinion. 
DATED this V day of (J/yUJ 1990. dfiL 
F . L . GUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
1072m 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dale M. Dorius, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box U, Brigham City, UT 84302 
and Miles P. Jensen, OLSON & HOGGAN, Attorney at Law, 56 West 
Center, P.O. Box 525, Logan, UT 84321. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 1990. 
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RECEIVED 
MAY i 5 1990 
DALfcM-DOWUS 
Attorney at Law 
Miles P. Jensen (#1686) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and THERESA 
L. LOOSLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, HILLAM 
ABSTRACTING AND INSURANCE 
AGENCY, Trustee, ALL PRO REAL 
ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah 
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS 
INCORPORATED, a Utah 
Corporation, and WILLIAM L. 
PACKER dba QUALITY BUILDERS, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 89000213CA 
•LSON a HOGGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
5 6 WEST CENTER 
P O BOX 5 2 5 
LOGAN UTAH 84321 
(801)752 1551 
REMONTON OFFICE 
123 EAST MAIN 
PO BOX 1 1 5 
MONTON UTAH 84337 
( 8 0 1 ) 2 5 7 3885 
Plaintiffs having made their Motion For Summary Judgment and 
i the Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association Of Loan 
1
 and Hillam Abstracting And Insurance Agency, having replied to the 
Jj same, and the Court having reviewed the file and being fully 
|j advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision 
>! dated April 4, 1990, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Box Elder County, State of 
Utah, and were owners of a certain home and real property located 
I in Box Elder County, State of Utah and more particularly described 
! as follows: 
2 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
(hereafter real property) 
Tfl^&thetr^with all ,~.the - improvements —now - or hereafter 
erected^on^ the ^ propertyJ~Tand-'-all-,easements> , rights/ 
yappurten^^ggy<g^ents, royalties, mineral oi] and gas 
fights and profits, ^ t^fTWgr^ 
and all fixtures now or hereafter attached to the 
property, all as further described in said Trust Deed, 
without warranty as to title. 
2. The Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association 
of Logan, is a Utah corporation with its place* of business in 
Brigham City, Box Elder County, Utah. 
3. The Defendant, Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, 
Trustee, is a Utah corporation. 
4. On or about September 11, 1980 the Plaintiffs entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase, with All Pro Real 
Estate Incorporated, a Utah corporation, and Quality Builders 
Incorporated, a Utah corporation, to acquire the real property 
described in Finding No. 1. 
5. On or about the 16th day of September, 1980, Plaintiffs 
executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in favor of Defendant, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, with Hillam 
Abstracting and Insurance Agency as Trustee, and said Trust Deed 
was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County Recorder, State 
of Utah on the 17th day of September, 1980, as Entry No. 80733H in 
Book 336 at Page 382; and said Trust Deed Note was secured by the 
aforementioned Trust Deed. 
6. Plaintiffs entered into the Earnest Money Agreement and 
Option to Purchase, and agreed on the purchase price and financial 
arrangements to purchase the home and real property described in 
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Findings of Fact No. 1 prior to any involvement or contact with 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan. Plaintiffs did 
not rely on Defendants' representations as to the value of said 
home and real property described in Finding No. 1. 
7. An appraisal done by Defendantf First Federal Savings 
Association of Logan, on said real property was done by agents of 
First Federalr*fotf its Jjitejrj^l'?^^ 
the ^ legitimacy p£^th€J®loan**£Or their-auditors and had no bearing 
in the obtaining of the initial transaction which gives rise to 
this litigation and Defendants never relied on said appraisal in 
purchasing said real property. 
8. No fiduciary^j;ele^ionsJbi.puJbecome established between the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant, First Federal Savings & Loan Association 
Of Logan, except as to the handling of money and not in any respect 
as to the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
From the foregoing Findings Of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The foregoing appear to be uncontroverted facts as to the 
elements which would be required to sustain an action based on 
fraudulent representation as set forth in the case of Duqan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), and consequently the Plaintiffs 
as a matter of law cannot sustain or establish the requisite 
elements for their cause of action and, accordingly, Defendants' 
Motion For Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' Complaint 
and Amended Complaint and causes of action as against Defendants, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan and Hillam 
Abstracting and Insurance Agency, as Trustee, are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be controverted that 
there was no reasonable reliance by the Plaintiffs upon any actions 
of Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan 
or its agents or upon Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency as 
Trustee. 
3. The depositions of Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa 
L. Loosle are on file with the Court and, pursuant to the request 
of Defendants, are accordingly published for purposes of 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 
DATED this /'/ day of May, 1990. 
r 
F. L. Gunnell, District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, to Plaintiffs' Attorney, 
Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and to 
Quinn D. Hunsaker, Attorney for Defendants, All Pro Real Estate 
Incorporated, Quality Builders Incorporated and William L. Packer, 
at 102 South 100 West, Brigham City, Utah 84302, postage prepaid 
in Logan, Utah, this 14th day of May, 1990. 
yLckfilL 
Miles P. Jensen 
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[OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(Telephone (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
1
 MARLIN K. LOOSLE and THERESA 
L. LOOSLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, HILLAM 
ABSTRACTING AND INSURANCE 
AGENCY, Trustee, ALL PRO REAL 
ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah 
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS 
INCORPORATED, a Utah 
Corporation, and WILLIAM L. 
PACKER dba QUALITY BUILDERS, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89000213CA 
Plaintiffs having made its Motion For Summary Judgment, and 
the Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association Of Logan 
and Hillam Abstracting And Insurance Agency, having replied to the 
same, and the Court having reviewed the file and being fully 
advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision 
dated April 4, 1990 and the Court having previously entered its 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law; 
It is hereby ORDERED as follows! 
1. The Plaintiffs as a matter of law cannot sustain or 
establish the requisite elements for its cause of action, which 
would be required to sustain an action based on fraudulent 
representation as set forth in the case of Duaan Q^jjjflTffi11 *M& f I? H 
M l C R O f l l M E O uwrmw • 
239 (Utah 1980), and, accord ingly , Defendants' Motion For Summary 
udgment i s granted and P l a i n t i f f s ' Complaint, Amended Complaint 
nd causes of a c t i o n as aga ins t Defendants, F i r s t Federal Savings 
Loan Assoc ia t ion of Logan and Hillaro Abstract ing and Insurance 
gency, as T r u s t e e , be and a re hereby dismissed with p r e j u d i c e . 
2 . The d e p o s i t i o n s of P l a i n t i f f s Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa 
». Loosle a re on f i l e with the Court and, pursuant t o the r e q u e s t 
f Defendants , a r e accordingly published for purposes of 
e f e n d a n t s ' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
DATED t h i s / Q day of May, 1990. 
, Dikt^ rit L. Gunnell# st ct Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
udgment and Order, to Plaintiffs' Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P. 
• Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and to Quinn D. Hunsaker, 
ttorney for Defendants, All Pro Real Estate Incorporated, Quality 
uilders Incorporated and William L. Packer, at 102 South 100 West, 
righam City, Utah 84302, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 
4th day of May, 1990. 
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OLSON & HOGGAN 
56 West Center 
P. O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
MARLIN K. LOOSLE and 
THERESA L. LOOSLE, 
Plaintiffs, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, ALL PRO 
REAL ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah, 
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS 
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation, 
and WILLIAM L. PACKER dba QUALITY 
BUILDERS, 
Defendants. Civil No. 890000213CA 
This matter came on for hearing at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on 
Friday, June 15, 1990, in the Court Room in the County Courthouse 
at Brighaia, Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell 
presiding. The matter in issue was Defendant First Federal Savings 
and Loan Association of Logan's Complaint dated March 8, 1990, 
originally filed as Civil No. 900000129, now consolidated with 
Civil No. 890000213CA. The Plaintiffs were present in person and 
were represented by their counsel, Dale M. Dorius, and Defendant, 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, was present and 
represented by its counsel, Olson & Hoggan, Miles P. Jensen, and 
the parties having called certain witnesses, introduced certain 
exhibits, and having made certain arguments to the Court, and the 
Court being fully advised in the matter, and having heard the 
Case No. 
2 
testimony, reviewed the exhibits and other documents on file/ and 
having issued its oral decision from the Bench, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle 
(hereafter -Loosles") are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court, 
2. Loosles acquired the following described real property 
(hereafter the "Property") on September 16, 1980: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30- West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30* West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86M8'30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. In connection with their purchase of the Property, on or 
about September 16, 1980, the Loosles, for valuable consideration, 
made, executed, and delivered to First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Logan (hereafter "FirstFed-) that certain Trust Deed 
Note dated September 16, 1980 in the principal amount of 
$67,000.00. By and through the Note, Loosles agreed to pay to 
FirstFed, or its order, the sum of $67,000.00, together with 
interest on the unpaid principal balance thereof at the rate of 
twelve and three/fourths percent (12.75%) per annum from and after 
the date of the Note. 
4. To secure the payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the 
Note, Loosles made, executed and delivered to FirstFed that certain 
Trust Deed dated September 16, 1980 (hereafter "Trust Deed"). The 
Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the Box Elder County, 
Utah, Recorder on September 17, 1980 as Entry No. 80733H in Book 
336 at Page 382 and pledged the Property. 
5. The Trust Deed provided as part of the Property pledged: 
TOGETHER with all the Improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights# 
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appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and 
authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply 
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and 
profits, water, water rights* and water stock, and all 
fixtures now or hereafter attached to the property, all 
of which, including replacements and additions thereto, 
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property 
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing, 
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if 
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred 
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.) 
6- The Property consists of 3.12 acres of real property with 
a home and outbuildings and is located adjacent to and west of 
State Highway 69, about 5 miles North of Brigham City, Utah, in the 
HHarper WardM area of Box Elder County# Utah. 
7. The Property has three (3) springs on it - two (2) of 
which are north of the home and supply a pond. The springs north 
of the home tend to be alkaline and salty and have not been used 
for culinary purposes. 
8. The third spring (hereafter "Loosle Spring") on the 
Property is located in front/east of the home. Loosles filed an 
Application To Appropriate Water from the Loosle Spring with the 
State Engineer on May 18, 1988, which Application has not been 
acted upon by the State Engineer. 
9. The Loosle Spring was the only source of culinary water 
for the home in 1980 when Loosles acquired the Property and was 
also used for irrigation purposes on the Property. 
10. The Loosle Spring was piped under the home to the 
rear/west side of the home into a pump house and collecting tank 
where it could be pumped into the home. The pump required 
electricity to function. The Loosle Spring water could also flow 
onto the Property and was used for irrigation purposes by Loosles 
from 1980 through August, 1989 when Loosles vacated the Property. 
11. Within a few days after Loosles moved onto the Property 
in 1980 they found the Loosle Spring water unacceptable for 
purposes of drinking. Loosles commenced hauling water into the 
home for drinking and for some cooking. They would obtain and haul 
4 
water from nearby neighbors in containers every two (2) or three 
(3) days or sometimes once a week, depending on the season and 
amount of water used. The Loosle Spring continued to supply water 
for household purposes other than drinking. 
12. The Loosle Spring became contaminated and tasted 
"brackish" whenever there was a heavy rain and became contaminated 
and tasted "brackish- during each irrigation season (April through 
October) when water from a nearby ditch seemed to contaminate the 
spring and increase its flow. 
13. In 1982 Loosles, along with Thomas Calvin Thorpe, Vonda 
J. Thorpe (hereafter collectively Thorpe), Von R. Curtis and 
Barbara F. Curtis (hereafter collectively Curtis) (all neighbors) 
entered into a verbal agreement to jointly dig a well on property 
owned by the Curtis' to serve each of the three (3) parties' homes 
and the interest of the Loosles in the well was for the benefit of 
the real property owned by Loosles. The well was dug to the South 
and East of the Property and across Highway 69. It consisted of 
the well, a pump, pump house, reservoir and one water line to serve 
the users. The well drilling was successful and thereafter Thomas 
C. Thorpe filed a Water Appropriation No. 57296 (29-2775) claim on 
the well with the office of the State Engineer of the State of 
Utah. The State Engineer approved the well application for the 
use, among others, of three (3) families (domestic plus .25 acres 
irrigation per family) on September 17, 1982. 
14. Thorpes, Loosles and Curtis' completed piping of the 
water from the well to each of their properties, including the 
Property, in late 1982 or early 1983. 
15. The well and well water right is now the only water right 
available in connection with the Property which is useable year-
round for culinary purposes and which is piped underground to serve 
the same and the plumbing for the home on the Property is designed 
so as to be able to use water from the well. The well water serves 
the Property and home by gravity flow and requires no pumping and 
no electricity to be used. 
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16. The pipeline frora the well is initially a four inch (4M) 
line covered by a protective casing and is 4-5 feet deep as it goes 
West from the well to Highway 69. The line then goes underneath 
Highway 69. On the West side of Highway 69 the pipeline splits 
into one (1) line to serve Thorpe (further to the West) and one (1) 
line to serve the Property (to the North). When it divides to 
serve Thorpe and the Property, the line to the Property is a two 
inch (2") line 4-5 feet deep covered by sand and other soil 
materials to protect it from damage from rocks. 
17. The well pipeline crosses property originally owned by 
Curtis for which there is a deeded easement in favor of Loosles 
evidenced by that Quit Claim Deed dated July 8, 1986 and recorded 
July 8, 1986 in Book 420 at Page 823 in the Office of the Recorder 
of Box Elder County, Utah, The well pipeline then traverses 
property owned by Thorpe and for which there was agreement that 
Thorpe would give Loosles a written deeded easement, although there 
is no evidence such an easement has been executed and delivered. 
The well pipeline from the well to the Property and home was dug 
with the approval and help of Curtis and Thorpe. 
18. The well pipeline connects to the line to the pumphouse 
and to the home on the Property and has a valve system so the well 
water can be used in the home and/or to irrigate, and 
alternatively, by switching a valve, the Loosle Spring water can 
be used in the home and/or to irrigate. 
19. Since late 1982 or early 1983 Loosles have not hand 
carried water into the home and the well water has been used daily 
since then and has been the exclusive source of domestic/culinary 
water. 
20. The Loosle Spring, Loosle Spring water rights, spring 
pump and pumphouse, spring collecting tank, well, well pipeline, 
well pipeline easements, as defined in Finding No. 17, well 
pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and 
attacliraents to the foregoing are all permanent improvements to the 
Property (hereafter collectively referred to as Improvements). 
6 
21. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are 
used beneficially in connection with it and are essential and 
critical to have the Property and home useable and marketable 
without a substantial loss in value, 
22. The Loosle Spring water and well water and water rights 
(hereafter collectively referred to as "Water Rights-) are 
appurtenant to the Property, are used beneficially in connection 
with it and are essential and critical to have a marketable and 
useable piece of real property and home. Without the Water Rights 
and Improvements the home on the Property has no reasonably useable 
water for culinary purposes and its value would be substantially 
reduced. 
23. By reason of Loosles' default in one or more of the 
installments due under the Note, FirstFed caused a Notice of 
Default to be served upon Loosles. The Notice of Default was 
recorded in the Office of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on 
« 
February 2, 1989 in Book 469 at Page 541. The Notice of Default 
was not cured nor was the obligation and Trust Deed reinstated 
within the time allowed by law. 
24. A Notice of Trustee's Sale dated June 26, 1989 was 
prepared and by reason of Loosles' failure to cure or reinstate the 
Trust Deed, FirstFed caused a Trustee's Sale to be held on Tuesday, 
July 25, 1989 at the Box Elder County Courthouse. 
25. FirstFed, being the highest bidder therefore, bought the 
Property secured by the Trust Deed for Sixty-three Thousand Five 
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($63,500.00). 
26. FirstFed is presently the owner of the following 
described real property which they acquired at the Trustee's Sale 
on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a foreclosure sale against Loosles, 
who were the prior owners of the property: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet Went from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48' 30" West 603 
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feot, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
06*40'30M East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
27, Loosles claim and assert an interest or ownership in the 
Water Rights and Improvements adverse to the claim of FirstFed, and 
such claims of Loosles are without any right whatever, and the 
Loosles have no estate, right, title or interest whatever in said 
Water Rights and Improvements or any part thereof. 
20. Any claims of Loosles to the Water Rights and 
Improvements are void and of no effect because the Water Rights and 
Improvements were pledged by Loosles to FirstFed and then acquired 
by FirstFed as part of the foreclosure (Trustee's Sale) of the 
Property. 
29. FirstFed and the Property have a great need and necessity 
for the Water Rights and Improvements and any and all rights and 
claims of Loosles to Water Righto and Improvements as described are 
void and of no effect and title should be quieted in the current 
record title owner of the Property, FirstFed-
30. Good Water Rights and successful culinary wells are very 
difficult to find and obtain in the Harper Ward area of Box Elder 
County and there is no city culinary water nearby. 
31. This decision is binding and is a determination of rights 
as to the Water Rights and Improvements and other items indicated 
as between Loosles and FirstFed and not for any rights as to any 
third parties or other parties not before the Court. 
32. There were no documents available at the time of 
execution of the Trust Deed to further evidence title to the Water 
Rights other than as referenced in the Trust Deed. 
33. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the 
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as: (a) it 
applies to improvements on the property either existing or 
subsequent; (b) it applies and pledges certain kinds of property 
interests which will occur and which need not be directly located 
on the Property, such as easements, rights and appurtenances; (c) 
0 
it includes water and water rights, which often do occur off of the 
property; and (d) it includes fixtures. 
34. The Court find3 that the language of the Trust Deed as 
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the 
testimony of the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the 
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are 
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title 
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and 
after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and 
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and 
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the 
foreclosure sale. 
35. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever 
severed or used their interest in the Well or water from the Well 
on anything but the Property. 
36. There is no or inadequate evidence that the Loosles ever 
severed or used their interest in the Loosle Spring on anything but 
the Property. 
37. The Loosles' sole reason and intent fo3C the Well, the 
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for 
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement 
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. 
38. The Loosles were interested in having two (2) sources of 
water to serve the Property, and both sources were pledged to 
j FirstFed and any and all interest in said Water Rights and 
Improvements now belong to FirstFed and are part of the Property. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
! 1. First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan 
(hereafter FirstFed) is presently the owner of the following 
jdescribed real property (hereafter the Property) which they 
acquired at the Trustee's Sale on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a 
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foreclosure sale against Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle 
(hereafter Loosles), who were the prior owners of the Property: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30" East along said 
right-of-way 225-5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30* West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48 '30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The Trust Deed is the determining document with the 
language cited in Finding Of Fact No. 5 inasmuch as it applies to 
improvements on the property either existing or subsequent; 
inasmuch as it applies and pledges certain kinds of property 
interests which will occur and not be located on the Property, such 
as easements, rights and appurtenances; it includes water and water 
rights, which often do occur adjacent to or nearby the Property and 
for fixtures. 
3. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the 
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest then and now of the 
Loosles in and to the Loosle Spring (including but not limited to 
the Application To Appropriate dated May 18, 1988, Application No. 
A63206) and in any documents evidencing any right, title, interest 
or claim is owned by and vested in FirstFed. 
4. Based on the intention of Loosles and the language of the 
Trust Deed, whatever right, title and interest of Loosles in the 
well, well water, easements and improvements (including but not 
limited to rights to use of a share of the well under Appropriation 
No. 57296 (29-2775) and in any documents evidencing any right, 
title, interest or claim in said well, well water, easements and 
improvements is owned by and vested in FirstFed. 
5. The Loosles' sole reason for the Well, easements and the 
improvements to the water system and the establishment of the Well 
water rights was for the improvement and benefit of the Property. 
6. The Loosle Spring, spring pump and pumphouse, spring 
collecting tank, well, well pipeline, well pipeline easements, well 
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pumphouse, well pump, well reservoir, well water rights, and 
improvements and attachments to the foregoing are all permanent 
improvements to the Property (hereafter collectively referred to 
as Improvements), 
7. The Improvements are appurtenant to the Property, are used 
beneficially in connection with it and are essential and critical 
to have the Property and home useable and marketable without a 
substantial loss in value. 
8. The Loosle Spring water and well water (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "Water Rights") are appurtenant to the 
Property, are used beneficially in connection with it and are 
essential and critical to the use and marketing of the Property 
and home. Without the Water Rights and Improvements the home on 
the Property has no reasonably useable water for culinary purposes 
and its value would be substantially reduced. 
9. Any and all rights and claims of Loosles to Water Rights 
and Improvements as described are null and void cind of no effect 
and title should be quieted in the current record title owner of 
the Property, FirstFed. 
10. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as 
interpreted and applied to this fact situation and based on the 
testimony of the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the 
Loosles, indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are 
covered by the language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title 
and interest of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and 
after acquired of the Loosles in and to Water Rights and 
Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, title and 
interest is owned by FirstFed by virtue of its purchase at the 
foreclosure sale. 
11. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the 
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for 
the iraprovement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement 
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. 
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12, The claims, right, title and interest of FirstFed in and 
to said Water Rights and Improvements is superior, free and clear 
of any title or claim of Loosles and all claims of Loosles are null 
and void and Loosles should be decreed to have no estate in, 
interest in, lien or encumbrance upon or right of use or sale of 
said Water Rights and Improvements. 
13. Loosles should be forever barred, enjoined and restrained 
from making or asserting any claim or interest in or to FirstFed's 
Water Rights and Improvements or clouding any portion thereof or 
in any way questioning, disturbing or attempting to disturb or 
interfere with the referenced Water Rights and Improvements. 
DONE in open Court this 15th day of June, 1990 and signed in 
open Court this /_ day of ^A^[] 1990. 
«rtrt ^ J^L 
FT'L.' Gunnell 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered an exact copy of the 
foregoing Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law to Plaintiffs' 
Attorney, Dale M. Dorius, at P. 0. Box U, 29 South Main Street, 
Brigham City, Utah 84302, this 16th day of July, 1990. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF THE 
S T A T E O F UTAH, IN AND FOR TIIK COUNT 1 
MARLIN K. I.OOSLE and 
THERES- " ,OOSLE, 
V6 . 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN" 
ASSOCIATION OF L0GAN# ALL PRO 
REAL ESTATE INCORPORATED, a Utah 
Corporation, QUALITY BUILDERS 
INCORPORATED, a Utah Corporation 
and WILLIAM L, PACKER clba QUALIT 
BUILDERS, 
Defendants. 
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:estimony, reviewed the exhibits and other documents on file, and 
laving issued its oral decision from the Bench, and having 
leretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
)f Law, the Court hereby makes the following: 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan 
hereafter FirstFed) is presently the owner of the following 
iescribed real property (hereafter the Property) which they 
icquired at a Trustee's Sale on July 25, 1989, pursuant to a Trust 
>eed foreclosure against Marlin K. Loosle and Theresa L. Loosle 
[hereafter Loosles), who were the prior owners of the Property: 
Beginning at a point on the West right-of-way line of 
Utah Highway No. 69 as presently located 1035.33 feet 
South and 69 feet West from the Northeast -corner of 
Section 22, Township 10 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 1*27'30* East along said 
right-of-way 225.5 feet, thence South 86*48'30" West 603 
feet, thence North 1*27'30" West 225.5 feet, thence North 
86*48 '30" East 603 feet to the point of beginning* 
2. Pursuant to a loan from FirstFed to Loosles, Loosles made, 
executed and delivered to FirstFed that' certain Trust Deed dated 
September 16, 1980 (hereafter Trust Deed) and recorded in the 
)ffice of the Box Elder County, Utah, Recorder on September 17, 
.9 80 as Entry No. 80733H in Book 336 at Page 382 which Trust Deed 
fas the basis for the foreclosure and Trustee's Sale above 
Iescribed and which Trust Deed pledged: 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter 
erected on the property, and all easements, rights, 
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and 
authorities given herein to Lender to coallect and apply 
such rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and 
profits, water, water rights, and water stockf and all 
of which, including replacements and additions thereto, 
shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property 
covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the foregoing, 
together with said property (or the leasehold estate if 
this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein referred 
to as the "Property": (Emphasis added.) 
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9. The Loosle Spring water and well water (hereafter 
collectively referred to as -Water Rights") are appurtenant to the 
Property, are used beneficially in connection with it and are 
essential and critical to the use and marketing of the Property and 
home. Without the Water Rights and Improvements the home on the 
Property has no reasonably useable water for culinary purposes and 
its value would be substantially reduced. 
10. Any and all rights and claims of Loosles to Water Rights 
and Improvements as described are null and void and of no effect 
and title is hereby quieted in the current record title owner of 
the Property, FirstFed. 
11. The Court finds that the language of the Trust Deed as 
interpreted and applied to this case and based on the testimony of 
the parties and exhibits, as to the intentions of the Loosles, 
indicates that the Water Rights and Improvements are covered by the 
language of the Trust Deed and whatever right, title and interest 
of the Loosles when the Trust Deed was signed and any and all after 
acquired right, title and interest of the Loosles in and to Water 
Rights and Improvements and any documents evidencing that right, 
title and interest is owned by FirstFed~by virtue of its purchase 
at the Trustee'8 Sale described in paragraph 1, above, 
12. The Loosles' sole reason and intent for the Well, the 
Improvements and the establishment of the Well water rights was for 
the improvement and benefit of the Property and is an improvement 
pledged to FirstFed within the language of the Trust Deed. 
13. The claims, right, title and interest of FirstFed in and 
to said Water Rights and Improvements is superior, free and clear 
of any title or claim of Loosles and all claims of Loosles are null 
and void and Loosles are hereby decreed to have no estate in, 
interest in, lien or encumbrance upon or right of use or sale of 
said Water Rights and Improvements. 
14. Loosles are forever barred, enjoined and restrained from 
making or asserting any claim or interest in or to FirstFed'8 Water 
Rights and Improvements or clouding any portion thereof or in any 
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